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Abstract
We estimate Nash equilibrium consumption externalities in household petrol
budget shares. The reaction curves are obtained from an AIDS with petrol
consumption externality. Using a continuous set of ten year cross sections from
FES (1991-2000), we analyse the externality generated by households living in
Newcastle area (UK). In each year, income decile cohorts are created. Panel
techniques are used after pooling cross section estimates have been discussed.
Using non nested procedures, two restricted models are compared: the cohort
speciﬁc externality eﬀect and the single popular case. The single popular is the
model accepted by the data.
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01 Introduction
Estimation and measurement of consumption externalities are still challenging prob-
lems in applied research. Particularly, estimation of Nash equilibrium consumption
externalities has not been the object of applied economic works. This paper pro-
vides a ﬁrst contribution in this direction. We estimate the externalities generated
by a particular good, petrol, on the consumption patterns of families living in a
metropolitan area in North England (Newcastle area). Since we want to analyse how
the family expenditure for petrol is inﬂuenced by the petrol expenditure decision of
the other families, a Nash setting seems the most appropriate to study this case. The
estimation of the Nash equilibrium externalities caused by petrol is interpreted as a
p r o x yo ft h ee x t e r n a l i t yc a u s e db yt r a ﬃc congestion in this area.
Traﬃc congestion has been theoretically recognised as a complex phenomenon
either for its physical representation or for modelling the individual decisions that
cause it. For its physical description, improvements have been done from microscopic
to macroscopic analysis, from static to dynamic models. Microscopic models have
the aim of tracking the behavior of individual vehicles: queuing theory is an example
of this kind of analysis as well as the car following theory (see May (1990)). Macro-
scopic models, instead, treat traﬃc as vehicle streams, described in term of density,
speed and ﬂow. The hydrodynamics theory is applied to analyse stationary and non
stationary conditions of these variables. The analysis of the fundamental diagram of
traﬃc ﬂow introduced by Haight (1963) is a central issue in the time independent
literature on this ﬁeld (see May (1990) for a survey on this topic). In a time depen-
dent contest, instead, the hydrodynamic model developed by Lighthill and Whitham
(1955) and Richards (1956) has been extensively used (see Daganzo (1997) for a sur-
vey). But it is reductive modelling traﬃc congestion only as a physical phenomenon
without considering it as the result of consumer decisions. Traﬃc congestion in con-
sumer theory has been essentially analysed as a negative externality on consumer
welfare. As with other negative externality phenomena, the literature on this topic
focuses on the equilibrium ineﬃciency and on possible tolls or pricing mechanisms
1to correct it (see for example Small (1992)). The positive and normative results of
interdependent negative externalities can be applied to the congestion problem. A
more speciﬁc congestion Nash equilibrium has been examined in bottleneck mod-
els. Vickrey (1969) studied the optimal departure time decision of a ﬁxed number
of identical drivers going to work using a road with a bottleneck of ﬁxed capacity.
Each driver is facing a trade-oﬀ problem: leave home inconveniently early to avoid
the queue or postpone the departure time incurring a schedule delay cost because of
the bottleneck. The driver can incur an additional trip cost if a time-varying toll is
applied. The equilibrium is reached when no driver has an incentive to change his
optimal departure time, given the departure time decision of the other individuals.
This model has been extended with diﬀerent contributions: heterogeneous individuals
have been considered in Cohen (1987) and in Arnott et al. (1993); diﬀerent pricing
regimes (uniform toll and step toll) have been the object of Arnott et al. (1993);
Ramsey prices have been analysed in Arnott and Marvin (1990). In these works only
numerical simulations are presented, no empirical application has been performed.
Only Small (1982) presented an estimation of the optimal scheduling of work trips
subject to a peak load demand, but without considering a Nash equilibrium setting.
In our work we consider a diﬀerent traﬃc congestion Nash equilibrium. We are
not interested in analysing how the daily individual departure time for work trip is
inﬂuenced by the departure time decisions of other individuals, but how the daily in-
dividual decisions of using the car is aﬀected by the decision of the car users living in
the same area. For this purpose we want to estimate if the annual household expen-
diture of petrol is interdependently inﬂuenced by the annual household expenditure
of petrol of the other families living in the same metropolitan area. We have chosen
to analyse the sample of households living in Newcastle. A continuous set of ten
year cross sections from the Family Expenditure Surveys (FES) is used to estimate
the petrol externality. In each year we have created ten income decile cohorts. This
particular data treatment allow us to observe the consumption behaviour of ten rep-
resentative households through time and to analyse how the externalities can aﬀect
2the Engel Curves of these ten representative households. Data can thus be treated
as panel data.
Firstly, we estimate the congestion Nash equilibrium assuming speciﬁc cohort ex-
ternalities: petrol total expenditure of each cohort aﬀects petrol budget shares of
other cohorts with the same intensity. A restricted form of this model is accepted.
Secondly, a special case of the original model is considered: the single popular ex-
ternality eﬀect. In this case, the cohort petrol budget share is aﬀected by the total
petrol expenditure of other representative cohorts. Using nonnested test procedures
the two restricted models are compared. The single popular externality eﬀect is the
most suitable to describe the Nash equilibrium household behavior. This result has
an important welfare implication. In order to internalise the negative externality
eﬀect, households should be taxed independently of household income. Both models
are ﬁrst analysed assuming pooled cross sections. Next we estimate them within a
panel framework. Fixed eﬀect model and random eﬀect model are compared and
tested. The cross section estimates give evidence that the household petrol consump-
tion pattern is explained by income and externality variables. Particularly, income
matters for the six poorest households. For the richest households only externality
variables and the intercept are signiﬁcant. The ﬁxed eﬀect model is rejected. The
random eﬀect model conﬁrms the results obtained by cross section techniques.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the second section we analyse the
theoretical model. The stochastic framework is introduced in Section 3. After a
section of data description (Section 4), we present the Nash equilibrium estimate
(Section 5). The speciﬁc cohort externality model is estimated in Section 5.1. In
Section 5.2 we show that the single popular externality eﬀect model is accepted by
the data. The same result is obtained also for larger data set (see Section 6).
2 Almost Ideal Demand System with externalities
In this section we provide a theoretical economic foundation of our work. A partial
equilibrium framework is assumed, in which prices, demographic variables, incomes
3are the exogenous variables of the model. The reaction curves are derived from an
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) with externalities (2). They can be interpreted
as Engel curves with externalities. They are the structural forms of our demand
system. Solving for the system of reaction curves, the Nash equilibrium is obtained.
2.1 Reaction curves
Suppose that petrol is good 1. Each household has a AIDS preferences with an
expenditure function of this type:
logght(p,zht,u ht)=aht(p,zht,W1kt)+bht(p)uht (1)
where p is the vector of prices, zht is the vector of demographic variables such
as number of children, age, number of workers in family h at time t, W1kt =
P
k6=h W1kt/(H − 1) is the deﬂated average total expenditure by each family other
than h at time t, uht is the utility function of family h.T h i s t e r m r e p r e s e n t s t h e
externality of our model. Essentially, petrol consumption is proportional to car travel
which is the source of congestion.
To develop a model consistent with the standard conditions required by the con-
sumer demand theory (satisfaction of the budget constraint and homogeneity of de-
gree 0 in prices of the income budget share constraint), particular restrictions on the



















4Applying Hotelling rule, the budget share of good 1 (petrol) of household h is given
by1:
w1ht = a01h + bh(p)b1huht =
= a01h + b1h(logMht − ah(p,zht,W1kt))
Finally, the reaction curves of the model are:







or in a compact form:
w1ht = A01h − b1h
X
i
aihzhit + C1hW1kt + b1hlogmht (2)
where:









In the sequel we approximate P by the deﬂator.
Diﬀerences in petrol budget share expenditures among households are imputed
to diﬀerences in income level, demographics, externality eﬀects, type of preferences.
These reaction curves can be interpreted as petrol Engel curves for each household
with externality eﬀect. The applied microeconomic analysis of the relationship be-
tween commodity consumption and income has a long tradition in the literature.
1 ∂loggi
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5Engel (1895), Working (1943), Leser (1963) are recognised as the seminal works in
this area. Muellbauer (1976), Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Jorgeson et all
(1982) specify all the requirements to make Engel curves compatible with integrabil-
ity consumer theory. The most recent studies of the Engel Curves (see for example
Hildenbrand (1994), Hausman et al. (1995), Banks et al. (1997)) indicate that
the standard linearity assumption in the logarithm of expenditure doesn’t provide a
satisfactory explanation of the budget share Engel curves for particular goods (i.e.
clothing, alcohol, non durable goods), but additional terms are required. The non
parametric analysis suggests that higher order income terms should be added (Banks
et al. (1997) restrict these higher income terms to being quadratic in order to sat-
isfy the integrability requirements of the demand system). In our work, instead, we
suggest that for the petrol case, the term to be added is the externality eﬀect. To
estimate and test the signiﬁcance of the externality, particular restrictions on the
externality eﬀect are imposed in the stochastic framework.
3 Stochastic framework
Let us assume that the stochastic term satisﬁes the condition E ∈jh= 0 and Var
(∈jh)=σ2
j for each h. The disturbance is normally distributed in the population as a
whole with the implication that the standard normal variable ∈jh /σ2
j has a mean of
zero and a variance of 1. Since we are looking only at the single equation for petrol, we
are also dropping the subscript speciﬁcation of the good. The stochastic framework of
our structural model coincides with the reaction curves previously deﬁned, corrected
by the error term:
wht = A0h + bh
X
i
aihziht + ChW1kt + bhlogmht+ ∈ht
To avoid identiﬁcation problems (numbers of parameters greater than the number of
observations), the data are reorganised as follow:
• the households are grouped in 10 diﬀerent cohorts according to the income
6decile of belonging;
• in each cohort, each household has identical parameters, i.e. identical prefer-
ences (bh = b; aih = ai; Ch = C for each h);
• for each decile we compute the mean of each variable in every year, which is
represented by a bar symbol over the letter;
• for any decile h, any other decile k has the same externality eﬀect Ck for all
decile h (with h 6= k );
• the coeﬃcient of the externality is constant through time.
Since we are dealing with ten cross sections, the stochastic framework of the
structural form of the model becomes under these assumptions:
w1t = A +
X
i
Ai1zi1t + C2W2t + C3W3t + ... + C10W10t + b1logm1t + e1t
. . .
w1t+9 = A +
X
i
Ai1zi1t+9 + C2W2t+9 + C3W3t+9 + ... + C10W10t+9 + b1logm1t+9 + e1t+9
w2t = A +
X
i
Ai2zi2t + C1W1t + C3W3t + ... + C10W10t + b2logm2t + e2t
. . .
w2t+9 = A +
X
i
Ai2zi2t+9 + C1W1t+9 + C3W2t+9 + ... + C10W10t+9 + b2logm2t+9 + e2t+9
. . .
w10t = A +
X
i
Ai10zi10t + C1W1t + C2W2t + ... + C9W9t + b10logm10t + e10t
. . .
w10t+9 = A +
X
i
Ai10zi10t+9 + C1W1t+9 + C2W2t+9 + ... + C9W9t+9 + b10logm10t+9 + e10t+9
7Ch is the parameter of the externality variable of cohort h.I t i n d i c a t e s t h e e ﬀect
on average of the externality caused by the petrol total expenditure of decile h on
the petrol budget share of the remaining deciles. Aih, bh measure respectively the
mean eﬀect of the demographic variable i a n do ft h el o go fi n c o m eo fd e c i l eh of each
cohort on the dependent variable. Ten representative decile cohorts have been thus
created, each of them representing the mean consumption behaviour through time
of a household with particular income condition. The ﬁrst decile cohort is tracking
the consumption pattern of the poorest representative household through time, the
last decile of the richest one. Previous literature on cohort analysis has been used to
test life-cycle theory. For example, Browning et al. (1981) estimate the individual
life-cycle of hours and wages. They simulate a panel data using cohort means of a
continuum of household cross sections. The cohorts have been created according to
the age of the head of the household. The age cohort mean of each variable can
be thus essentially interpreted as an individual panel observation, reproducing the
behaviour of the representative consumer in a particular period of his life. In our
case, the information on consumption patterns are at a more aggregate level since
the households have not been grouped on the basis of an individual variable but
considering a household variable. The representative consumer interpretation seems
appropriate only assuming that the head of household income is the main source of
household total expenditures. It seems diﬃcult, also, to interpret this model in term
of life cycle theory. We can’t test if the ﬁnancial conditions of the representative
household in time t are stationary or are evolving in the following time periods.
To estimate the model, the externality eﬀect can be approximated to Wht =
wht ∗ mht for each h =1 ,..10 and t =1 ,..10. Considering the low variability of the
income in each cohort decile, this approximation is acceptable. In a vector form the
model becomes :
8w1 = A +
X
i
Ai1zi1 + C2w2 ∗ m2 + C3w3 ∗ m3 + ... + C10w10 ∗ m10 + b1logm1 + e1
w2 = A +
X
i
Ai2zi2 + C1w1 ∗ m1 + C3w3 ∗ m3 + ... + C10w10 ∗ m10 + b2logm2 + e2
(3)
w10 = A +
X
i
Ai10zi10 + C1w1 ∗ m1 + C2w2 ∗ m2 + ... + C9w9 ∗ m9 + b10logm10 + e10
where wh, zih,mh, logmh are the ten observation vectors respectively for the petrol
budget share, demographic variable i,i n c o m ea n dl o go fi n c o m eo ft h ed e c i l ec o h o r t
h (with h =1 ,..10).
The structural form is a non linear simultaneous equation model with 10 en-
dogenous variables represented by the total petrol budget expenditure means of each
decile cohort. The estimation of each equation independently of the others is equiva-
lent to the estimation of each single reaction curve. But the estimation of the overall
system requires the imposition of an equilibrium condition. In brief, the estimation
of the equations simultaneously is equivalent to the estimation of the Nash equilib-
rium behaviour in the petrol pattern consumption of each representative cohort. To
have a unique numerical estimation of the structural coeﬃcients of our model, the
system of simultaneous equations should be identiﬁed. Let us deﬁne M as the num-
ber of exogenous variables in the system; Mi as the number of exogenous variables
appearing in equation i; G the number of endogenous variables. A necessary condi-
tion for a system to be identiﬁed is that for each equation the number of excluded
exogenous variables ( M −Mi) should be at least as great as the number of included
right-hand-side endogenous variables ( G−1). This is the “order condition” for iden-
tiﬁcation of each equation (see, for example, Wooldridge (2001) p. 215). In our case
this condition is satisﬁed since M − Mi >G− 1 in each equation. The satisfaction
of the order condition is not suﬃcient for the identiﬁcation of the parameters of the
structural equations. Another condition should be satisﬁed, the so called “rank con-
dition”. Let us deﬁne Ri as the Ji × (G + M) matrix of known constant where Ji
is the number of restrictions on the vector of structural parameters of equation i.I n
9a linear system of endogenous variables, the coeﬃcients of the structural equations
are identiﬁed if and only if the rank RiB = G − 1, where B is the (G + M) × G
matrix of structural parameters in the system (see, for example, Wooldridge (2001)
p. 218). In our case, the system is non linear in the endogenous variables since
the right hand side endogenous variables are multiplying the exogenous income vari-
ables. To simplify the estimation, one method extensively used is to relabel the non
linear function of the endogenous variables as new variables. In our model, thus, we
have ten additional endogenous variables. It has been shown (see Wooldridge (2001)
pp. 230- 234) that using this method the rank condition should be applied “with-
out increasing the number of equations” (Wooldridge (2001) p. 234): in our case
rank RiB =9f o rt h ei d e n t i ﬁcation of the system. In the appendix B, we show that
this condition is satisﬁed. The model is, in principle, overidentiﬁed, since the number
of excluded exogenous in each equation is greater that the number of right hand side
endogenous variables. The estimates of the structural parameters are not unique.
One way of ensuring uniqueness is to apply 2sls to a system of simultaneous equation
model overidentiﬁed, the estimates of the parameters are uniquely identiﬁed. Before
presenting the empirical results applying this technique, the data set is described in
the next section.
4 Data description
We used data from the 1991 to 2000 Family Expenditure Surveys (FES) of the United
Kingdom to estimate the externality eﬀect. The ten cross sections of seven thousand
British families have been divided into diﬀerent subsamples according to the geo-
graphic location of each household. The geographic location has been speciﬁed by
two spatial variables: standard region (i.e. North West, North, Welsh, Greater Lon-
don,...) and administrative area (i.e. metropolitan-non metropolitan area classiﬁed
according to the density of the population). Each subsample represents thus the
expenditure record of families living in the same geographic region with the same
population density. Among all the subsamples created, we have decided to focus
10on the samples of families living in metropolitan zones since only in these zones
the public transportation system is extensively developed, oﬀering a valid alterna-
tive to personal motoring. The decision between using the car or using the public
transportation system can be thus aﬀected by the traﬃc congestion of the area. In
non-metropolitan or rural area this alternative is not eﬀectively present due to the
relative lack of the local transportation. Personal motoring may represent the only
option for households, despite of the level of traﬃc congestion reached in the area:
it should be diﬃcult to test the presence of negative interdependent externalities in
the petrol expenditures of resident households. We have also excluded London since
it has always represented an exception for the complexity of its urban structure and
transportation systems. From the ﬁve samples created in each year (respectively for
Glasgow, Newcastle, Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham), in this paper we have cho-
sen to present the results of the estimates of the petrol consumption externalities
of households located in Newcastle and surroundings. Table 1 shows the number of
observations available for our study in each year. Each cross section represents the
random sample of households living in Newcastle each year. We cannot follow the
individual household behaviour through time, as in the panel data. But since we are
dealing with a continuum of cross sections, in each year we can create representative
households according to particular criteria and follow the consumption of these rep-
resentative households through time. In Browning et al. (1985) the households have
been grouped according to the age of the head of the households. In our case the
representative households are created in relation to the income decile to which they
belong. We have originated ten income cohorts in each cross sections. Looking at the
mean behaviour of these cohorts of households through the surveys, we can track the
mean behaviour of households placed in the same income decile through time. The
cohorts means can be interpreted thus as a panel data.
Table 2 indicates the number of observations in each random sample once the
missing values have been dropped. As expected, the missing values are present in
the less recent cross sections (1991-1993).
11Table 1: Number of households in each cross section for Newcastle












Table 2: Number of households in each cross section without missing values












Table 3 and Table 4 examine respectively the means over time for each decile
and the overall means of each sample without missing values. The means of the
demographic variables are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected once the missing values have been
eliminated. Only the sample overall means of the variables in the three cross sections
1991-1993 are inﬂuenced. In principle, we could have left the missing values: they
are irrelevant for the robustness of our estimations. For methodological accuracy,
we have decided to drop them. The number of workers and the number of cars are
on average increasing in each decile. The age of the head of the household tends to
decrease. Since our aim is to measure the traﬃc congestion of the Newcastle area,
the samples have been further selected considering only households owning at least
12Table 3: Mean by decile of number of workers, children, cars and age without missing
values
Decile workers children cars age
1 .0991736 .1570248 .0495868 61.87603
2 .0967742 .2903226 .1209677 58.77419
3 .2518519 .4740741 .2222222 51.57037
4 .4744526 .4525547 .4525547 54.31387
5 .7769784 .7338129 .5467626 47.47482
6 1.06993 .6013986 .7202797 47.97203
7 1.340278 .7916667 .7916667 45.34722
8 1.438849 .7625899 .9208633 45.57554
9 1.819444 .6388889 1.326389 43.94444
10 1.934783 .9202899 1.456522 43.7971
tot .957478 .5923754 .6788856 49.761
a car and with positive petrol expenditure. We are not considering corner solution
equilibria.
Table 4: Mean by year of number of workers, children, cars and age without missing
values
Year workers children cars age
1991 1.266129 .6048387 .7016129 46.79839
1992 1.212329 .6986301 .8424658 48.13014
1993 1.130435 .5869565 .7101449 47.25362
1994 .82 .5066667 .6333333 50.68
1995 .8322581 .5870968 .6322581 51.65161
1996 .872 .672 .632 50.44
1997 .8741259 .5804196 .6433566 50.32867
1998 .9848485 .5227273 .9208633 45.57554
1999 .6444444 .5185185 .7424242 49.80303
2000 .9741379 .6637931 .7068966 50.42241
tot .957478 .5923754 .6788856 49.761
Table 5 shows the number of households in each random sample once households
without cars or with a null annual petrol expenditure have been eliminated. Since
the random samples selected are now more restricted, the households are less hetero-
geneously distributed as before. In Table 6 it is possible to observe that the means
of the demographic variables for each year sample don’t vary signiﬁcantly over time:
the factor of randomness of the samples has been reduced. Looking at Table 7, the
average number of workers increases in each decile while the average age is signiﬁ-
13Table 5: Number of households in each cross section with positive budget shares












Table 6: Mean by year of number of workers, children, cars and age with positive
budget share
Year workers children cars age
1991 1.355932 .5084746 1.237288 47.20339
1992 1.5625 .6875 1.3625 46.725
1993 1.424242 .6060606 1.242424 46.06061
1994 1.238806 .7014925 1.208955 46.40299
1995 1.152778 .5694444 1.263889 48.93056
1996 1.425532 .5744681 1.297872 46.48936
1997 1.350877 .5438596 1.245614 46.50877
1998 1.3 .4166667 1.366667 49.63333
1999 1.132075 .5660377 1.188679 49.73585
2000 1.413043 .8478261 1.391304 45.73913
tot 1.337727 .601318 1.280066 47.36244
cantly reduced in each cohort, sensitively in the lowest deciles. This suggests that
the number of observations dropped refer principally to single unit households of
pensioners or unemployed.
As expected, the means over time for workers and cars are increasing in each
decile. The decile cohorts in the middle of the income distribution have the higher
number of children on average. The oldest households belong to the lowest decile,
characterised principally by pensioners. Let us now consider the means within decile
and over time of total petrol expenditure deﬂated2 and petrol budget shares (see
2To deﬂate the variable used in this Table, we have used the OECD 1999 Deﬂator Serie and
the petrol price per litre from “Transport Statistics Great Britain 27th edition (2001)” by the
Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions, p. 38.
14Table 7: Mean by decile of number of workers, children, cars and age with positive
budget share
Decile workers children cars age
1 .3606557 .0655738 1 59.2459
2 .6229508 .3934426 1.032787 49.95082
3 .9672131 .5245902 1.147541 48.96721
4 1.183333 .6666667 1.166667 49.4
5 1.311475 .7704918 1.163934 45.72131
6 1.622951 .8688525 1.229508 43.01639
7 1.516667 .5333333 1.216667 45.81667
8 1.852459 .6885246 1.442623 43.98361
9 1.983607 .7540984 1.704918 44.88525
10 1.966667 .75 1.7 42.56667
tot 1.337727 .601318 1.280066 47.36244
Table 8: Average total expenditure, petrol expenditure, and petrol budget shares
over time
Decile totexp. petrol exp. petrol budget shares
1 53.6121 8.129355 .1481841
2 92.60303 6.606084 .0766885
3 126.3519 9.729563 .0764968
4 158.8654 11.39887 .0720053
5 201.4903 12.12694 .0608531
6 250.3391 14.43917 .057878
7 300.2375 15.61528 .0522787
8 361.0419 16.59269 .0461743
9 464.1758 20.92153 .0453375
10 733.3229 23.82057 .0346958
tot 374.1571 16.87412 .0521555
Table 8 and Table 9).
From Table 8 it is evident that a representation of the externality in term of petrol
budget shares can not be suitable to measure the inﬂuence of traﬃc congestion on
the household petrol consumption decision since will underestimate the impact of
this phenomenon. This is due to the fact that the increase in total expenditure in
each decile cohort is more than proportional to the increase in petrol expenditure.
Even if the total petrol expenditure is increasing in each decile cohort, the petrol
budget share results diminishing. In Table 9, instead, we can observe that the year
mean of total expenditure deﬂated and petrol expenditure deﬂated tend to increase
15Table 9: Average total expenditure, petrol expenditure, and petrol budget shares in
each cross section
Year totexp. petrol exp. petrol budget shares
1991 346.2454 15.02674 .0554029
1992 372.5229 15.2792 .0471209
1993 357.5089 16.43975 .0537472
1994 346.2005 15.75768 .0515714
1995 379.7666 17.51672 .0491743
1996 375.5325 15.65215 .0502422
1997 407.7989 16.46249 .0484754
1998 404.9928 18.74149 .0553383
1999 344.2831 18.42868 .0588379
2000 419.7327 20.79272 .0546436
tot 374.1571 16.87412 .0521555
proportionally through time: the petrol budget share means are almost constant. In
the following sections we present the estimates of our work.
5 Estimating Nash equilibrium
In this section the Nash equilibrium estimates are presented. Firstly, we show that a
restricted version of model speciﬁed in (3) is accepted (the accepted restrictions are
C1 = C2 = C4 = C5 = C6 = C9 = 0 (see Section 5.1)). Secondly, another restricted
model is considered: the single popular externality eﬀect. The restrictions imposed
are: C1 = ... = C10 = C (see Section 5.2). The two restricted models are compared
and tested. For both of them, after the independent pooling cross section estimates
we present the results of the panel data estimators.
5.1 The restricted speciﬁc cohort model
As previously explained in section 3, the structural form of our model is a non linear
system of simultaneous equations. To simplify the method of estimation, the system
is rearranged as follows:
16
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We have transformed the original non linear simultaneous equation model in a lin-
ear system with endogenous variables. The dependent variable is represented by the
petrol budget share vector of each decile (wh with h =1 ,..10), the included exoge-
nous variable i is a variable with demographic or income decile h observations if the
decile= h and null observations if decile h 6= k (with h and k =1 ....10). The ex-
ternality variables are the endogenous variables of the system. Externality variable
h is characterised by null observations if decile=h, and petrol total expenditure for
the remaining deciles. We are assuming that the petrol total expenditure of each
cohort is aﬀecting the petrol budget shares of the other cohorts with the same inten-
sity. Since the endogenous variables are correlated with the error terms, to provide
consistent and eﬃcient estimations an appropriate estimation method is required.
We should ﬁnd a set of instrumental variables (excluded exogenous) correlated with
the endogenous variables but uncorrelated with the error terms. The ﬁrst stage of
the estimation consists in regressing each endogenous variable on all the exogenous
variables. The second stage consists in running the structural equation regression,
replacing each endogenous variable with its own ﬁtted values stored in the ﬁrst stage
regressions. To ensure valid standard errors and t statistics, we have applied 2sls
Stata econometric package. The estimates of the pooled independently cross sections
17Table 10: Pooling cross section estimates
Coeﬃcients Standard error t-value p-value
constant 0.6834 0.274 2.77 0.007
logincome2 -.0909∗∗∗∗ 0.0374 -2.43 0.018
logincome3 -.0889∗∗∗ 0.0387 -2.30 0.024
logincome4 -0.094∗∗∗∗ 0.0375 -2.51 0.014
logincome5 -0.0760∗∗∗ 0.0360 -2.11 0.038
logincome6 -0.0756∗∗∗ 0.0350 -2.16 0.034
logincome7 -0.0795∗∗∗ 0.0350 -2.28 0.026
logincome8 -0.0850∗∗∗ 0.0367 -2.31 0.023
logincome9 -0.070∗∗∗ 0.0322 -2.19 0.032
logincome0 -0.0726∗∗∗ 0.0312 -2.33 0.022
car1 -.41201∗∗∗ 0.2056 -2.00 0.048
car2 -0.4628 0.1075 0.43 0.668
car4 0.0828 0.0552 1.50 0.138
car9 0.0350 0.0280 1.25 0.213
workt9 -0.0308 0.0310 -1.00 0.322
ext.income3 -0.0038∗∗∗∗ 0.0015 -2.54 0.013
ext.income7 -0.0018∗∗∗ 0.0009 -2.02 0.046
ext.income8 -0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0017 -2.23 0.029
ext.income10 -0.0012∗∗∗ 0.0005 -2.05 0.044
R2 0.010
R2 − adjusted -0.2095
n 100
NOTES: (1)∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 2.5 per cent level
(2)∗∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 per cent level
are shown in Table 10. Instead of adding year dummy variables to take into account
the eﬀect of diﬀerent variables distribution through time, we have made the obser-
vations of each random sample identically distributed through time deﬂating all the
variables dependent on prices (i.e. total expenditure, log of total expenditure, total
petrol expenditure).
These estimations are the ﬁnal results of the 2sls stepwise regression, once the
less signiﬁcant variables have been dropped out in each step on the base of a t test.
The unrestricted model has been thus rejected in favour of a more restricted one,
assuming that C1 = C2 = C4 = C5 = C6 = C9 =0 . The demographic variables seem
almost irrelevant in the explanation of the consumption pattern of household petrol
budget expenditures (only the number of cars in decile 1 is signiﬁcant at the 2.5 per-
cent of the conﬁdence interval). The signiﬁcant variables that explain the household
18Table 11: Diagnostic tests of the pooling cross sections
Sargan Test: χ2(15)=9.7948 [0.8324]
Test for endogeneity: F(4,77)=13.60 [0.0000]
Heteroskedasticity Test: F(35,45)=1.1459 [0.3303]
Testing beta=0: χ2(18)=69.444 [0.0000]
Normality Test: χ2(2)=0.2921 [0.8628]
consumption behaviour of this good are the log of deﬂated total expenditure and
externality variables. All the diagnostic test requirements are satisﬁed and there is
evidence of endogeneity (see Table 11).
The set of instruments satisﬁes the requirement of exogeneity (see Sargan Test)3.
The test for endogeneity is checking that the residuals obtained from the reduced form
for the endogenous variables using OLS are signiﬁcant in the structural equations.
In this case we reject the null (coeﬃcients of the residuals null) at the 1 per cent
signiﬁcance level. We can not reject the null hypothesis that the error terms are
homoskedastic (Heteroskedasticity test)4, independently and identically distributed
as a normal N ∼ (0,σ2) (Normality test). This is evident also from the Fig. 1.
We reject also the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients of the structural model are null
(testing beta=0).
In Figure 2 we graph the actual and ﬁtted values of our model. The observations
are distributed along the intercept of the quadrant, but with a signiﬁcative dispersion.
Our analysis can be further extended considering Panel data econometric ap-
proaches. Particularly, in Table 12 the results of the ﬁxed eﬀect model are presented.
The externality variables have still a signiﬁcative explanatory power, but not
surprisingly the log of income variables are no longer signiﬁcant in this case. Probably
because of the lack of variability of these variables through time in each decile. This
i se v i d e n tf r o mF i g u r e3a n d4w h e r et h el o go fd e ﬂated total expenditure is almost
3In details, the set of instruments used are: the variables for the number of cars in real terms
of decile 1,3,0; total number of workers of decile 7; total number of workers in real term for decile
1,2,4,6,7,8,10; log of income squared for decile 1; 3 additional income variables for decile 3,4,8 in
which the own income decile observations are repeated for each decile and 3 additional car variables
for decile 2,3,7 having the own car decile observations repeated in each decile.
4Consider model (6.3). In the equilibrium, the budget share of each equation is a function also
of the error term of all the remaining equations. In principle, we should expect Heteroskedasticity.































Figure 2: Plot of actual and ﬁtted values of petrol budget shares with pooling cross
sections.
20Table 12: Panel data: ﬁxed eﬀect estimates
Coeﬃcients Standard error t-value p-value
constant 0.6349 0.2725 2.33 0.020
logincome2 -.0791 0.0584 -1.35 0.175
logincome3 -.0740 0.0885 -0.84 0.403
logincome4 -0.0670 0.0881 -0.76 0.448
logincome5 -0.1242 0.1682 -0.74 0.460
logincome6 -0.1299 0.1209 -1.07 0.282
logincome7 -0.0182 0.0770 -0.24 0.813
logincome8 -0.0575 0.0650 -0.88 0.377
logincome9 -0.0779 0.0745 -1.05 0.296
logincome0 -0.1251 0.0851 -1.47 0.142
car1 -.41201∗∗∗ 0.2056 -2.00 0.048
car2 -0.0625 0.1058 0.59 0.555
car4 0.0843∗ 0.0523 1.61 0.107
car9 0.0388 0.0275 1.41 0.158
workt9 -0.0320 0.0304 -1.05 0.293
ext.income3 -0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0015 -2.33 0.020
ext.income7 -0.0015∗∗ 0.0008 -1.75 0.080
ext.income8 -0.0032∗∗ 0.0017 -1.88 0.059




NOTES: (1)∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 per cent level
(2)∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent level
(3)∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 2.5 per cent level
(4)† This is the F test on the individual dummy variables
constant for each decile through time.
The ﬁxed eﬀect model cannot be a suitable framework to explain our problem,
since the hypothesis of null individual speciﬁcd u m m yv a r i a b l e si sa c c e p t e do nt h e
base of the F test speciﬁed in Table 12. The unobserved ﬁxed individual eﬀects are
thus irrelevant to explain the household externality behaviour. The random eﬀect
model is inestimable due to the fact that the rank of the variance covariance matrix is
null. In this framework, when few cohort speciﬁc externality variables are signiﬁcant,
the pooling independent cross section across time is the model that better describes
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Figure 4: Log of income of the ﬁve richest income decile cohort through time
22Table 13: Pooling cross section estimates of the single popular externality eﬀect
Coeﬃcients Standard error t-value p-value
constant 0.1017 0.0294 3.45 0.001
logincome1 -0.0522∗ 0.0364 -1.43 0.156
logincome2 -0.0258∗∗ 0.0148 -1.74 0.085
logincome3 0.0044∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0010 4.73 0.000
logincome4 -0.0205∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0074 -2.76 0.007
logincome5 0.0032∗∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0009 3.47 0.001
logincome6 0.0014∗∗ 0.0009 1.62 0.109
car1 0.2948∗∗ 0.1746 1.69 0.095
car2 0.1511∗∗∗ 0.0692 2.18 0.032
car4 0.1194∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0364 3.27 0.002
car9 0.0481∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0173 2.78 0.007
workt2 0.0122 0.0221 0.55 0.584
wortk9 -0.0401∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0147 -2.72 0.008
sumext -0.0004∗∗∗ 0.00019 -2.12 0.037
R2 0.5177
R2 − adjusted 0.4448
n 100
NOTES: (1)∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 per cent level
(2)∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent level
(3)∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 2.5 per cent level
(4)∗∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 per cent level
(5)∗∗∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.5 per cent level
5.2 The single common popular channel
In the previous section a restricted form of the original model has been estimated.
Another special case of the original model can be considered: the common popular
single channel eﬀect, in which the cohort petrol budget share is aﬀected by the petrol
expenditure of the other representative cohorts. The restrictions imposed are thus:
C1 = ... = C10 = C.
The result of the pooling independent cross section estimates are shown in Table
13. As in the previous case only income and externality regressors are relevant in
the explanation of the household petrol consumption: demographic variables result
almost irrelevant, numbers of car are signiﬁcant only for the less wealthy house-
holds. Income is important for the 6 poorest deciles. For the richest households
only externality variables and the constant are signiﬁcant in explaining their petrol
consumption behaviour.
23The independent pooling cross section regressions satisfy all the diagnostic test
requirements (see Table 14).
Since we are dealing only with one right hand side endogenous variable, the test
of endogeneity is a tt e s ton the residuals of the reduced form of the externality
variable in the structural equation. Since the residual variable is signiﬁcant, we can
not reject the hypothesis of endogeneity. Also in this case the standard errors are
independently and identically distributed as a normal function (see Fig. 5).
Figure 6 plots the actual and ﬁtted values of petrol budget shares assuming the
single popular externality hypothesis. Comparing to Figure 2, the observations show
less dispersion along the 45 degree line.
This observation can be suﬃcient to reject the model estimated in the previous
section. For a more rigorous procedure we use the Davidson-MacKinnon test for non
nested model5.
I nT a b l e1 5w es h o wt h er e s u l t so ft e s t i n gt h es i n g l ep o p u l a re x t e r n a l i t ym o d e l
against the restricted cohort speciﬁc externality model previously estimated. Since
the ﬁtted values of the ﬁrst model presented in this section are not statistically
signiﬁcant we can not reject the single popular externality model.
In Table 16 instead the cohort speciﬁc externality eﬀect is tested against the
single popular channel. Also in this case the ﬁtted values of the second model are
not signiﬁcant: it is not possible even to reject the ﬁrst model tested. Since both
the models are accepted according to the MacKinnon-Davidson test procedure, an
additional selection criterium should be considered. There is common agreement that
the comparison of the adjusted R2 can be used to discriminate between the models
(see, for example, Wooldridge (2003) p.295). In this case the common popular model
appears to be the most appropriate to describe households consumption behaviour
(its adjusted R2 value is higher that the one of the other model).
Since the single common popular is the accepted model, we can extend further the
5As previously argued, both the models estimated are speciﬁc cases of the original model pre-
sented in section 6.3. In the previous case we have imposed that C1 = C2 = C4 = C5 = C6 = C9 =0
. In the single popular model, instead, that C1 = ... = C10 = C. None of them can be obtained as
a special case from the other.
24Table 14: Diagnostic tests for the single popular externality case with pooling cross
sections
Sargan Test: χ2(6) = 3.0015 [0.8087]
Test for endogeneity: t(84) = 2.74 [0.007]
Heteroskedasticity Test: F(25,60) = 0.42031 [0.9904]
Testing beta=0: χ2(13) = 110.52 [0.000]













Figure 5: Standard errors are indipendentely and identically distributed as a normal
N ∼ (0,σ2) in the case of the single popular externality eﬀect
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ﬁtted values II model .2512712 0.79
n 100
NOTES: (1)∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 2.5 per cent level

















Figure 6: Actual and ﬁtted values of petrol budget shares in the case of a single
common popular externality eﬀect with pooling cross sections.
analysis of its interpretative power considering a panel data setting. In Table 17 and
Table 18 the results of the ﬁxed eﬀect model and of the random eﬀect are respectively
presented. As in the previous case, the ﬁxed eﬀect is rejected on the base of a Ft e s t .
The Hausman test favours to the random eﬀect model: χ2(12)=1.19 [1.0000].
The null hypothesis that the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed and the random eﬀect
coeﬃcient is not systematic is accepted. It is not possible to reject the hypothesis
at the base of the Random eﬀect model that the unobserved individual eﬀect is
uncorrelated with each explanatory variable.
Comparing the random eﬀect model with the independent pooling cross section
model, it is interesting to notice the similarity of the estimate results.
6 Other metropolitan area data sets
This chapter focuses on the measuring of congestion Nash equilibrium in Newcastle
area. In Uk, there are other four metropolitan areas: Birmingham, Leeds, Glasgow,
Manchester. Glasgow data set has similar number of observations to the Newcastle
27Table 17: Panel Data: ﬁxed eﬀect estimates of the single popular externality eﬀect
Coeﬃcients Standard error t-value p-value
constant 0.1063 0.1000 1.06 0.288
logincome1 -0.0538∗ 0.0366 -1.47 0.141
logincome2 -0.034 0.0490 -0.70 0.486
logincome3 -0.012 0.0661 -0.18 0.854
logincome4 -0.0520 0.0613 -0.85 0.397
logincome5 0.0804 0.1020 0.79 0.430
logincome6 0.01513 0.08533 0.18 0.859
car1 0.2948∗∗ 0.1746 1.69 0.095
car2 0.1442∗∗ 0.0817 1.76 0.078
car4 0.1199∗∗∗∗∗ 0.03605 3.33 0.001
car9 0.0497∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0176 2.83 0.005
workt2 0.0106 0.0251 0.42 0.671
wortk9 -0.0327∗ 0.0216 -1.52 0.129




NOTES: (1)∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 per cent level
(2)∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent level
(3)∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 2.5 per cent level
(4)∗∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 per cent level
(5)∗∗∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.5 per cent level
(6)†This is the F test on the individual dummy variables
data set (795 observations without missing values and with positive petrol budget
shares). The data set of families living in Birmingham with a positive petrol budget
expenditure is characterised by 1543 observations. The number of observations for
households in Leeds is 2155. The biggest data set is characterised by the year random
samples of households living in Manchester (2292 observations once missing value and
null petrol expenditure have been eliminated). The results obtained in the relatively
small data set representing the Newcastle area are still conﬁrmed in the other data
sets, despite of the increase in the number of observations. For example in Table
19 we estimate the single popular externality model with independent pooling cross
sections for Manchester (the sample with the largest number of observations). There
i ss t i l le v i d e n c eo fn e g a t i v ee x t e r n a l i t ye ﬀects in the households petrol expenditures.
Also in this case all the diagnostic requirements are satisﬁed (see Table 20) and
the externality variables is endogenous.
28Table 18: Panel data: random eﬀect estimates of the single popular externality eﬀect
Coeﬃcients Standard error t-value p-value
constant 0.1029 0.0290 3.54 0.000
logincome1 -0.0515∗ 0.0354 -1.45 0.147
logincome2 -0.0256∗∗ 0.0145 -1.76 0.078
logincome3 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0019 2.32 0.000
logincome4 -0.0205∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0074 -2.78 0.007
logincome5 0.0032∗∗ 0.0018 1.82 0.069
logincome6 0.0015 0.0017 0.87 0.386
car1 0.2918∗∗ 0.1700 1.72 0.086
car2 0.1505∗∗∗ 0.0673 2.24 0.025
car4 0.1195∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0354 3.37 0.001
car9 0.0484∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0168 2.88 0.004
workt2 0.0117 0.0215 0.55 0.585
wortk9 -0.0399∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0147 -2.70 0.007
sumext -0.0004∗∗∗ 0.00019 -2.23 0.026
R2 0.5177
n 100
NOTES: (1)∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 per cent level
(2)∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent level
(3)∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 2.5 per cent level
(4)∗∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 1 per cent level
(5)∗∗∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.5 per cent level
The ﬁxed eﬀect model is not accepted: the F test on the individual dummies
doesn’t reject the null hypothesis: F(9,77) = 0.60. The results obtained in relatively
small samples are still conﬁrmed once larger number of observations are considered.
7 Conclusion
We provide empirical estimates of Nash equilibrium negative externalities in house-
hold petrol budget shares. For this purpose we have used a continuum of ten cross
sections from FES (1991-2000), selecting random samples of households living in
Newcastle. In each year the household observations have been grouped according
to the household income decile. Ten representative income decile cohorts have been
created. We evaluate two restricted models, namely the cohort speciﬁc externality
eﬀect and the single popular case, using cross section and panel data techniques. The
single popular model is the one most suitable to describe the consumption behaviour
of our samples. This result is conﬁrmed also for data sets with larger observations.
29Table 19: Pooled cross section estimates for Birmingham
Coeﬃcients Standard error t-value p-value
constant 0.0788 0.0151 5.21 0.000
logincome1 -0.0320∗∗ 0.0167 -1.92 0.058
logincome3 0.0011∗∗ 0.0007 1.69 0.095
logincome5 -0.0075∗ 0.0051 -1.49 0.140
logincome6 -0.0011∗∗ 0.0007 -1.71 0.091
logincome8 -0.0089∗∗ 0.0052 -1.72 0.090
logincome9 -0.0020∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0006 -3.31 0.001
car1 0.1765∗∗∗ 0.0784 2.25 0.027
car2 0.0095∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0034 2.73 0.008
car5 0.0331∗ 0.0228 1.45 0.149
car7 -0.0053∗∗ 0.0027 -1.95 0.054
car8 0.0291∗ 0.0200 1.45 0.150
car0 -0.0108∗∗∗∗∗ 0.0020 -5.30 0.000
sumext -0.0002∗∗ 0.0001 -1.77 0.080
R2 0.6795
R2 − adjusted 0.6311
n 100
NOTES: (1)∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 10 per cent level
(2)∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 5 per cent level
(3)∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 2.5 per cent level
(4)∗∗∗∗∗indicates signiﬁcance at the 0.5 per cent level
Table 20: Diagnostic tests for the single popular externality case with independent
pooling cross sections for Birmingham
Sargan Test6: χ2(3)=0.74148 [0.8634]
Test for endogeneity: t(16,83)=4.11 [0.0000]
Heteroskedasticity Test: F(25,59)=1.1457 [0.1166]
Testing beta=0: χ2(13)=205.97 [0.0000]
Normality Test: χ2(2)=2.7475 [0.2532]
We suggest that, in order to internalise the externality eﬀect, a tax independent of
household income should be implemented.
30Appendix A: Identiﬁcation of the system
Consider the system (3):
w1 = A +
X
i
Ai1zi1 + C2w2 ∗ m2 + C3w3 ∗ m3 + ... + C10w10 ∗ m10 + b1logm1 + e1
w2 = A +
X
i
Ai2zi2 + C1w1 ∗ m1 + C3w3 ∗ m3 + ... + C10w10 ∗ m10 + b2logm2 + e2
w10 = A +
X
i
Ai10zi10 + C1w1 ∗ m1 + C2w2 ∗ m2 + ... + C9w9 ∗ m9 + b10logm10 + e10
To simplify the analysis suppose that the system is organised in three decile
cohorts and that only one demographic variable is present in each equation:
w1 = A + A11z1 + C2w2 ∗ m2 + C3w3 ∗ m3 + b1logm1 + e1
w2 = A + A22z2 + C1w1 ∗ m1 + C3w3 ∗ m3 + b2logm2 + e2
w3 = A + A23z3 + C1w1 ∗ m1 + C2w2 ∗ m2 + b3logm3 + e10
The model is a non linear simultaneous system in three endogenous variables w1,w2,
w3 (G = 3) with six predetermined exogenous variables (M =6 )a n dt w op r e d e -
termined variables for each equation (Mi = 2). According to Fisher (1965), for
identiﬁcation it is suﬃcient to relabel wi ∗mi as new variables (with i =1 ,..,3) and
to obtain that rank RiB =2( t h en u m b e ro ft h eoriginal endogenous variables minus
1).
The “extended” form of our model becomes:
w1 = e12w2 + e13w3 + A11z1 + A12z2 + A13z3 + C11w1 ∗ m1 + C12w2 ∗ m2 +
C13w3 ∗ m3 + b11logm1 + b12logm2 + b13logm3 + A + e1
w2 = e21w1 + e23w3 + A21z1 + A22z2 + A23z3 + C21w1 ∗ m1 + C22w2 ∗ m2 +
C23w3 ∗ m3 + b21logm1 + b22logm2 + b23logm3 + A + e2
w3 = e31w1 + e32w2 + A31z1 + A32z2 + A33z3 + C31w1 ∗ m1 + C32w2 ∗ m2 +
C33w3 ∗ m3 + b31logm1 + b32logm2 + b33logm3 + A + e3
31with eij = Aij = bij =0i fi 6= j with i =1 ,2,3a n dj =1 ,2,3a n dCij =0i f
i = j.
Consider the rank condition for equation 1. We should prove that rank R1B =2 .
The matrix R1 and B (previously deﬁned in section III) are respectively:
R1 =































                                     

The matrix R1B is thus:
32R1B =

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
Imposing the restrictions previously speciﬁed (eij = Aij = bij =0i fi 6= j with
i =1 ,2,3a n dj =1 ,2,3a n dCij =0i fi = j), we get ﬁnally:
R1B =











                

The rank R1B =2 :t h eﬁrst equation satisﬁes the rank order condition for identiﬁa-
bility. Applying the same method, we can prove that the order condition is satisﬁed
also for the other equations. We have riorganised the system in three cohorts, for an-
alytically convenience. This proof can be easily extended to the system of 10 cohorts.
Using the same method, the condition rankR1B =9i sp r o v e d .
33Appendix B: Price series used in this work











NOTES: *OECD 1999 price deﬂator series
**Transport Statistics Great Britain 27th edition (2001)
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